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OUR LAND IS YOUR LAND: INEFFECTIVE
STATE RESTRICTION OF ALIEN LAND
OWNERSHIP AND THE NEED
FOR FEDERAL
LEGISLATION
INTRODUCTION

The recent unprecedented flow of foreign investment into
the United States' has increased awareness of the dangers of
foreign ownership of American resources. In an effort to reduce
foreign control of vital American resources, policymakers at various levels of government have attempted to legislate effective
guides for foreign investment. However, the lack of coordinated
legislative effort has resulted in a chaotic and ineffective structure, which in turn has led to the renaissance of xenophobia 23
the unreasonable fear of foreigners.
Fear and suspicion of foreign investment in the United
States is not new. In pre-revolutionary times, some colonies restricted ownership by citizens of other colonies, a practice which
the Constitution of the United States terminated. 4 After the
American Revolution, some states expropriated the holdings of
1. The changing circumstances of international trade, particularly increased prices for petroleum, as well as political instability in foreign countries, caused this inflow of capital in 1973. In that year alone, direct foreign
investment increased by $3.42 billion, more than a threefold increase over
the previous year. This represented a 23 percent rise in the aggregate foreign direct investment in the United States. See DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 5 (Oct., 1975) [hereinafter cited as FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT].

Foreign direct investments are investments in a host country by a foreign investor having ability to control the operation of the investment. It is
distinguished from foreign portfolio investment, which is simply noncontrol
purchases of state securities. See ForeignDirectInvestment in the U.S. Real
Estate, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 491 (1972) [hereinafter cited as U. FLA. L. REV.].
The above government figures do not include real estate investments,
because they traditionally have been considered a local activity and any
regulation, such as registration, has always been at the local level. See Inouye, Political Implications of Foreign Investment in the United States, 27
MERCER L. REV. 597 (1976).
2. See notes 25-54 and accompanying text infra.
3. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1644 (2d ed. 1970).
4. The right to "take, hold, and dispose of property, either real or personal" is included within the scope of the privileges and immunities clause,
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (3230) (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1823) (dictum).
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English subjects, treating the British not only as aliens, but also
as enemies. 5 Suspicion of foreign investment is sometimes
overcome by the economic need for it.6 As a young nation, the
United States depended on European capital to aid in the development of its industry and trade. 7 Even today, those states
which view foreign investment as a source of potential prosperity have actively encouraged foreign investment by maintaining
offices abroad. 8 Continued ambivalence toward alien investment is predictable in view of these dual attitudes, suspicion
and economic need. 9
The resurgence of alien investment has taken a variety of
forms, from banking and securities to trade. 10 The most sensitive area has been alien acquisition of land, 1 particularly farm
land. 12 The investment rush has been building for years, and is
5. See Morrison, Limitationson Alien Investment in American Real
Estate, 61 MmN. L. REV. 621, 622 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Morrison].
6. For a discussion of the motivation behind suspicion and encouragement see Gaffney, Social and Economic Impacts of Foreign Investment in
United States Land, 17 NAT'L RESOURCES J. 377, 389 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Gaffney].
7. See Morrison, supra note 5, at 622.
8. Numerous individual states have mounted intensive drives to lure
foreign capital. For instance, Georgia, Michigan, New York, South Carolina,
and Virginia maintain representatives in Brussels, Tokyo, and London. Alabama and North Carolina have offices in Switzerland. Maine and Wisconsin
have offices in Frankfurt. Foreign Investment in the United States: Policy
Problems and Obstacles, I1 THE CONFERENCE BOARD RECORD 33-34 (1974).
9. Compare The Foreign Land-Grab Scare, TvIE 40 (Jan. 8, 1979)
(xenophobic overreaction) with The Selling of America, TIME 71 (May 29,
1978) (foreign capital creating jobs and controversy).
10. See Wilner & Smith, Is Georgia on Their Minds?-Some Legal Aspects of Investment and Trade by Foreign Business Enterprises,27 MERCER
L. REV. 629, 633-42 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Wilner & Smith].
11. A land purchase is simply a transfer from buyer to seller. One buying land is not directly employing domestic labor. It is a mere swap of situations without a change in the aggregates. This results in freeing up a
seller's funds and raising land prices. The seller may buy more land, but
land is limited, so there is always a net seller. The national well-being is not
affected. A consequence of the foreign capital influx into the land market is
a loss of young people's ability to buy land for business and home purposes.
See Gaffney, supra note 6, at 377, 379.
Another consequence is that foreign capital which increases the value
in the real estate also increases property taxes. See The ForeignLand-Grab
Scare, TIME 40 (Jan. 8, 1979).
12. Central Valley farmers in California are apprehensive about increasing foreign control of U.S. farm land. They claim it is becoming nearly
impossible for them to pick up additional acreage because foreigners keep
raising the price on what is available. Also, because of the increased value
in their land, which they don't want to sell, they are subject to a higher
property tax which makes it difficult for them to continue possessing the
land they do have. Another concern is that young farmers cannot obtain
their own apparatus because land costs are soaring. See Rubin, The Selling
of California,CAL. B.J. 409, 410 (Dec. 1978).

Government officials are also apprehensive about expanding foreign
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13
now gaining added momentum as the investors get richer.
Land is economically stable, so the foreign investors' desire to
purchase land is not precipitated merely by a desire to succeed
financially. They 14are already wealthy; they just want to avoid
becoming poorer.

While it is true that more foreigners are acquiring American
land than ever before, the number of acres under foreign ownership, at least from a national perspective, is minimal. Of the 1.3
billion acres of private land in the United States, less than one
15
However, land
percent, 4.9 million acres, is foreign-owned.
control of United States farm land. The nation's agricultural exports, about
$24 billion in 1977, are a major component of American trade. The government would rather not see foreigners control the source of that trade. Id.
13. One factor in this increase in momentum of foreign investment is
the dollar slump, which has enabled holders of West Germany's mark, Switzerland's franc, Japan's yen, and other strong currencies to buy a piece of
America at bargain prices. See The Selling of America, TIME 71 (May 28,
1978). More important, however, is that the United States appears to be the
country best suited to ride out the tempest caused by high energy prices,
sluggish international growth, and protectionist trade sentiments. Id. It
also seems to be the nation least vulnerable to the terrorism that is ravaging
Italy and haunting West Germany, or the political unrest that is paralyzing
Canada, and spreading through the underdeveloped nations. Indeed, it appears that America is selling stability. Id.
14. Although foreign investors are seeking stability, there are several
other reasons why investment in United States land is given high priority
among the economic goals of foreigners. For instance, the prices of real estate are low compared with those prevailing in other parts of the world, and

there is a considerable tax advantage allowed foreign investments in

United States realty. See U. FLA. L. REV., supra note 1, at 494.
The situation in Japan illustrates why American property is such a
good buy. Because real estate prices are so high in land-scarce Japan, Japanese investors seem grateful to be able to purchase real estate even at
prices which seem too high for American investors. For example, in 1974,
property in downtown Los Angeles sold at $50 per square foot, but similar
land in Tokyo sold at $900 per square foot. See Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1974, at 1,
col. 6; id., Jan. 22, 1974, at 1, col. 2.

If an alien is a nonresident, and the investment is not effectively con-

nected with United States trade or business, he can avoid capital gains taxation. I.T.C. §§ 871(b), 882(b). The terms "resident v. nonresident" and
"effectively connected" are words of art. See generally Alexander, U.S. Taxation of Real Estate Owned by Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Corporations, 13 DUQ. L. REV. 37 (1974); Feinschiecher, Foreign Investment in U.S.
Real Estate: The Federal Tax Consideration,3 REAL EST. L.J. 144 (1974).
Otherwise, foreigners pay property and income taxes like all Americans

(recognizing appropriate deductions). See I.R.C. § 871(a) (1) (individual
taxpayers); § 881(a) (1) (corporations). For individuals, these deductions

exist regardless of whether they are foreigners: (1) casualty or loss deductions, id. § 873(b) (1) (see also id. § 165(c) (3)); (2) deductions for charitable

contributions, id. § 170; and (3) one personal exemption, id. §§ 151,

142(b) (1).
15. G.L. WUNDERLICH, Foreign Ownership of U.S. Real Estate in Perspective, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, ECONOMIC STATISTIC AND COOPERATIVE
SERVICE, 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as WUNDERLICH]. See note 62 infra (estimate on foreign corporate ownership of land).
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purchases are not evenly distributed among the states, and not
all land is equally valuable. 16 Therefore, foreign investment can
be more significant in one individual state or region. 17 The
states are more aware of the problem, and also less capable than
the federal government of dealing with it. 18
When a state attempts to control alien ownership of land
within its borders, it has two major objectives: Mechanical and
constitutional effectiveness. To be mechanically effective, the
state statute must avoid loopholes by specifically and conclusively stating what it covers, and why. To be constitutional, the
statute must avoid conflict with due process' 9 and equal protection 20 requirements, and with powers granted to Congress by
2
the Constitution. '
Present state statutes restricting alien property ownership
do not adequately fulfill these objectives. 22 This inadequacy, a
result of evolution, place.= the burden for effective control of
alien land ownership on the federal government. While other
countries' legislatures have responded to foreign investment by
imposing strict laws making foreign ownership the exception to
the general rule of exclusion,23 the United States has just begun
16. Id.
17. Although data on foreign ownership are insufficient, there have

been a number of highly publicized purchases of farm land by foreign investors which appear to be of great significance: 6,000 acres in Utah; a 12,000
acre farm in Illinois; a 23,000 acre ranch in Wyoming; and 17,000 acres in
Georgia. See WUNDERLICH, supra note 15, at 2.
There has also been significant purchasing of nonagricultural land in
New York: Greek-owned Olympia Tower stands across from an Iranian
building on Manhattan's Fifth Avenue. In Georgia, the Atlanta Hilton is
Kuwaiti owned. In Los Angeles, the Century City Medical Plaza is British
and Dutch owned, and the New Otanis Hotel is Japanese owned. The
Pennzoil Building and One Shell Plaza in Houston are German owned. See
The Selling of America, TIME 71-73 (May 29, 1978).
18. See notes 56-102 and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 138-41 and accompanying text infra.
20. See notes 103-37 and accompanying text infra.
21. See notes 142-76 and accompanying text infra.
22. See notes 56-59, 142-76 and accompanying text infra.
23. The laws of three countries, Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia, are
illustrative of the types of restrictions on foreign investment which are becoming increasingly prevalent worldwide.

In Canada, the response to foreign ownership has taken the form of provincial laws placing severe restrictions on the sale of land to foreigners. In
Ontario province, an alien purchasing land is subject to a land transfer tax
amounting to 20 percent of the purchase price, and anyone selling land to a
foreigner is taxed up to 50 percent of his profit. See Lamont, Energizing
Neo-Mercantilism in Canadian Policy toward State Enterprises and Foreign Direct Investment, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 121 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Lamont]; MACINTOSH, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CANADA-RECENT
TRENDS IN PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1974, 113-14 (U. Cameron ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited

as MACINTOSH]. See also Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1974, at 28, col. 1. In order for
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to consider the impact of foreign investment within its borders.24 The purpose of this article is to explore the various restrictions currently imposed by the states, point out their
mechanical and constitutional ineffectiveness, and recommend
rational comprehensive legislation by the federal government.
an alien to purchase more than ten acres of shore front on Prince Edward

Island, he must first acquire government approval. See Lamont, supra, at
121; MACINTOSH, supra, at 113-14.
Nova Scotia has taken the most drastic action in Canada by expropriating American-owned property. Id. See also Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1974, at 28,
col. 2 (listing land parcels which the province intended to acquire either by
settlement or expropriation).
Under Mexico's Foreign Investment Law of 1973, all real property
owned by foreigners in Mexico must be registered with the ministry of foreign affairs. Law for the Promotion of Mexican Investment and to Regulate
ForeignInvestment, DIAro OFFICIAL, Mar. 9, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Act of
19731. The investor is required to enter an agreement with the Mexican
government, pursuant to the calvo clause, which precludes the foreign investor from involving his country's official assistance in Mexican land disputes. Id. See generally Elder, Expropriation: Hickenlooper and
Hereinafter, 4 INT'L LAw. 611 (1970). Furthermore, the Mexican Constitution prohibits ownership of land within a "prohibited zone." FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF

THE UNITED STATES OF

MEXICO, art.

27, § 1. The prohibited

zone is all land within 100 kilometers of Mexican land borders and within 50
kilometers of the Mexican seacoast. Id. The act provides, in addition to the

registration requirement, that aliens be permitted to invest in land trusts of
30 year duration so long as the land is not in the "prohibited zone." See
Meck, Land Transfer and Finance in Mexico, 4 DENVER J.L. & POL. 25, 29
(1974). See also Chayet &Sutton, Mexican Real Estate Transactionsby Foreigners, 4 DENVER J.L. & POL. 15 (1974). Furthermore, foreign equity investment in Mexican business enterprises owning legal title to realty outside
the "prohibited zone" is allowed if the foreign participation does not exceed
a 49 percent foreign ownership limit imposed by the Act of 1973.
Saudia Arabia is by far the most restrictive of foreign investment. It
generally prohibits the ownership of realty by foreigners, but it does grant
specific exceptions. If the ministers of agriculture approve, a foreigner can
acquire farm land. ROYAL DECREE No. M/22 of 12/7/1390 (Sept. 13, 1970) $
3(b). Foreign enterprises permitted to operate in Saudia Arabia may own
realty necessary to their activity, provided a license is obtained from the
minister of commerce and industry. Id. I 3(c). However, no exceptions are

available for real estate located within the limits of the Holy Mosques of

Mecca and Medina. Id. 1.
24. In 1976, due to the inadequacy of the information on foreign investment, Congress passed The International Investment Survey Act of 1976, 22
U.S.C. § 3103(d) (1976). The report will examine such problems as the

means by which ownership identity can be cloaked; the usefulness of public

title and tax records in providing data; and the adequacy and timeliness of
comparable methods of reporting in other countries. Id. The study's purpose is to improve data on foreign ownership of land, in order to realize its
effect. See WUNDERLICH, supra note 15, at 2. The planned date for completion was late 1979. Id. See notes 177, 192 and accompanying text infra (dis-

cussion of new federal disclosure laws).

Until that report appears, it will not definitely be known who these foreign investors are. However, one commentator concluded that it is the
Germans and the Italians who are the heaviest investors, followed by the
British, French, Belgians, Canadians, and Dutch, with the Japanese and the
Arabs trailing far behind. The Foreign Land-Grab Scare, TiME 40 (Jan. 8,
1979).
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HISTORICAL ANALYSIS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF INCONSISTENCY

It is difficult to account for the complexity and inconsistency
of state laws affecting the alien landholder without examining

such laws in light of the historical conditions from which they
evolved. As a whole, restrictions developed in response to special pressures that arose in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Thus, state alien land law today represents an accretion of more than a century of lawmaking.
Legislative development occurred in four distinct
phases,
each a response to the prevailing legal and economic conditions
of the times. First, there was the adoption of common law disabilities during the colonial and revolutionary periods. Second,
in the early and middle nineteenth century, the strict common
law prohibition was replaced by the requirement that an alien
become a citizen as a condition of land ownership. Third, at the
end of the nineteenth century, federal legislation restricting
alien ownership in the frontier states was enacted. Finally, land
ownership requirements of the states were once again made restrictive by anti-Japanese legislation predicated on the Naturalization Act of 1913, which itself was revitalized during World War
Ii.
Adoption of Common Law Disabilities

English law permitted aliens to take property by purchase
but not by inheritance. 25 This premise was the foundation of
early American land law.26 By the time of the Revolution, the
principle that an alien could not acquire good title to land was
axiomatic in colonial law. Unless an alien was made a citizen by
naturalization, he could not acquire land.27 To obtain naturalization, the alien had to apply to the colonial legislature, which
would issue limited letters of naturalization effective only within
25. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 249-50 (J. Wendall ed. 1847).
26. Originally, under English feudal law, the king granted land to his
lords, upon oath of fealty to the king. Designed as it was to secure allegiance to the crown through military service, the system could not tolerate
alien land ownership, so it was excluded. Id. at 248-49.
27. No other remedy was available, for colonial governments could not
adopt laws contrary to those of England. See GOBEL, CASES ON DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INsTrrUnONs 350 (1930) (English doctrine on relation of col-

onies to English laws).
Denization, admission to residence with certain rights and privileges,

was disfavored by the crown because of colonial liberality in the procurement of it. In 1709, after New York granted that status to a notorious smuggler, the crown curtailed the authority of colonial governors to issue letters
of denization.

See generally 1 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES

Wendall ed. 1847).

374 (J.
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that colony. 28 This procedure caused many problems. Many
aliens lacked the time, money, and influence needed to sponsor
an act through the assembly. Many others who were ignorant of
the law purchased land in good faith without realizing that absent legislative authority their titles were defective.
As the alien population grew in the colonies, so did alien
land ownership. Lack of good title became a major concern. Relief was sought through bills to quiet and confirm titles derived
from aliens. The British Crown was reluctant to authorize these
bills, but finally accepted two in 1764.29
In 1773, with interest in the colonies growing, the British
Crown ordered colonial governors to reject any alien title bill or
30
naturalization measure the colonial assemblies might enact.
In effect, the instructions were an absolute prohibition of alien
ownership of land. The colonies feared that such restrictive
British policies would discourage the immigration of aliens and
thus hamper colonial development. A disparity existed: The colonial interest demanded liberal policies on alien ownership of
land; the British interest was just the opposite.
In 1776, the colonies addressed the highly restrictive British
policies concerning land ownership through the Declaration of
Independence. The colonies alleged that the Crown had "endeavored to present the population of these states; for the purpose of obstructing the laws of Naturalization of Foreigners;
refusing to pass other to encourage their immigration hither,
and raising the conditions of new appropriations of land."
Independence, however, did not completely eradicate restrictions on alien ownership of land. It was natural for the
newly independent states to retain the idea of discriminating
against aliens regarding landholdings, as it was deeply engrained in the British heritage. Furthermore, the British subjects were now aliens, and there was apparently good reason for
28. See Sullivan, Alien Land Laws: A Re-Evaluation, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 15,
26 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan].
29. It accepted similar bills in New York and North Carolina with visible
reluctance. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 28.
Governor Moore of New York expressed the need for the bill to the
British government. He wrote that its intent was
... to quiet the minds of several people holding estates originally made
by aliens, who through their ignorance of the law, had neglected to get
naturalized, and though their possessions had passed by several
desents to their children and collateral branches born within New York,
yet as title was originally deficient, it might in future occasion some difficulties to the possessors [sic].
8 O'COLLAGHAN, DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK 169 (1857).
30. 1 LABAREE, ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS,

1670-1776, at 154 (1935).
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colonials to hold on to the British property. 31 Reaction against
common law alien restrictions was thus short-lived. The newly
formed states soon became more restrictive; however, the laws
32
were flexible. Liberal policies were followed when necessary,
but when the need was not so great the common law disabilities
were revived or replaced with comparative legislative restrictions. Today, only a few states have retained common law disa33
bilities.
Relaxation of Strict Common Law Restrictions
Judicial interpretation of the Constitution has firmly placed
control of land law in the hands of the states. 34 This state control laid the foundation for a hodgepodge of inconsistent laws
concerning alien land ownership. The tendency was toward removal of strict common law restrictions. This process accelerated after the Civil War, until in 1880 aliens could hold land on
the same terms as citizens in over half the states. 3 5 A major impetus towards leniency was the country's desire to use alien
land ownership as a means of western expansion. 36 However, as
foreigners became more numerous, the frontier population became fearful of outside influence and control. 37 Again, in response to this fear, the trend toward raising the alien to the
status of citizen for the purpose of land ownership was reversed
in the 1880s and 1890s, and would not return until the mid1900s. 3 8
31. During the revolution, many states imposed landholding restrictions
which applied not only to loyalists but also to persons whose places of birth
and residence clearly established they were British subjects. A few states
enacted statutes declaring British subjects to be aliens, and then treated

them in the same manner in which the British treated aliens. The remainder of the states treated British subjects as enemy aliens under the common law. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 29 n. 62.
32. Ohio was the first state to treat aliens as citizens in landholding matters. 1804 Omo LAws at 123.
33. See note 56 infra.
34. See Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 251, 270 (1817). See also
Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 484 (1880).
35. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 29.
36. See Morrison, supra note 5, at 622.

37. Some of the aliens purchasing land were members of the British nobility who began acquiring large ranches. One ranch, the XlT, controlled
3,000,000 acres in Texas. Another, the Matador Land and Cattle Company,

held over 1,000,000 acres in the same state. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at
30-32. See also NORDYKE, CATTLE EMPIRE (1949); WARREN & WARREN, THE
MATADORS, 1879-1951 (1952), for descriptions of the operation of these large
English-controlled cattle companies. The xenophobia of this period was
promoted by fears of foreigners seeking to establish themselves as landlords, fear that statehood could be jeopardized, and fear of becoming an economic colony of Great Britain. See Morrison, supra note 36, at 625.
38. During this period eight states which had granted aliens the same
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Federal Legislation in FrontierStates
Congress responded to fear of alien land ownership by enacting the Territorial Land Act of 1887, which prohibited extensive alien land holdings unless the resident alien had applied for
citizenship. 39 Other federal laws also restricted acquisition of
homesteads or other federal land by aliens or alien-controlled
tobusinesses. 4° Most of these federal laws are not significant
41
day, for the territories covered have since become states.
The newly-formed midwestern states enacted laws resembling the Territorial Land Act,42 and their anti-alien attitude was
sanctioned by the courts.43 In some states, these laws remain on
the books today.4
Anti-Japanese Legislation Predicatedon the Naturalization
Act of 1913
In the early part of the twentieth century, anti-Japanese
sentiment developed in the Pacific coast states. 45 The pressure
for restriction on Japanese land ownership, in which race
prejudice and economic motives blended almost indistinguishably, centered in California, which had abolished the condition
of citizenship for landholding.4 California reintroduced a modified citizenship requirement in 1913. 47 The law seized upon a
peculiarity in the federal nationality laws which barred Oriental
treatment as citizens adopted restrictions (Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, and Wisconsin). Three other states (Idaho,
Indiana, and Texas) added to their existing restrictions. See Sullivan,
supra note 28, at 31 n.68. See also note 57 infra.

39. 48 U.S.C. §§ 150-57 (1970).
40. 43 U.S.C. § 161 (1970); 43 C.F.R. § 2511.1 (1974) (homesteads); 43

U.S.C. § 315 (1970); 43 C.F.R. §§ 4121.1-1(a)-(c) (1974) (federal grazing land).
See note 97 infra (2,600 acts of Congress dealing with property rights on
federal public lands).
41. See Mining Law of 1872 § 1, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1970). However, restrictions on alien ownership of federal mineral lands have continuing importance. They are applicable to all mineral deposits except petroleum
deposits and a few other minerals.
42. See note 38 supra.
43. See, e.g., Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S.
313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v. Thompson, 263

U.S. 197 (1923) (denying aliens the right to acquire and own land); Pastore
v. Pennsylvania, 322 U.S. 138 (1914); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876)
(limiting the right of noncitizens to exploit states' natural resources).

44. See note 58 infra.
45. Japanese-controlled farms in California had increased from 4,698
acres in 1900 to 99,254 acres in 1910, reaching a peak of 321,276 acres in 1920.
See Ferguson, The CaliforniaAlien Land Law and the FourteenthAmendment, 35 CALiF. L.

REv.

61, 68, 71 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Ferguson].

46. See Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 337 n.1 (1901).
47. 1913 CAL.STATS. § 206.
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persons from naturalization, and stated the prohibition of land
alien ineligibility for citizenship under
holding in terms of
8
4
United States law.

In 1923, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the California statute was constitutional. The basis of the Court's ruling was that this statutory discrimination against aliens rested
upon a reasonable classification and did not conflict with the
due process of law and equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. 49 As a result, the California act rapidly became the model for a proliferation of state laws creating
restrictions based upon an alien's ineligibility for citizenship
under federal law. 50
World War II, which produced new prejudices against the
Japanese, prompted additional states to enact restrictive statutes. 5 1 However, after the war, the significance of these restrictions began to wane. In 1952, Congress passed an amendment to
the Federal Immigration Law5 2 which eliminated the class of

"ineligible aliens," 53 and state laws which based exclusion on ineligibility for United States citizenship consequently became
meaningless. Shortly thereafter, the California legislature,
which had been at the forefront in advocating heavy restrictions,
repealed its act and provided compensation for those whose
land had been forfeited.5 4 Nevertheless, many states still have
laws in effect that restrict alien ownership of land and are based
55
upon the federal immigration law.

48. This avoided patent discrimination against the Japanese. See Morrison, supra note 36, at 27 n.30, for a discussion of the development of immigration laws.
49. Porterfleld v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923).
50. Within five years, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Arizona, Kansas, Texas,
and Delaware adopted similar statutes, while New Mexico and Louisiana
went further, incorporating restrictions on ineligible aliens into their constitutions. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 34.
It is important to the understanding of xenophobia to note that restrictions were not only strong in the Pacific states, but were in existence in
states such as Kansas, whose populations included few Japanese. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 34. See also KAN. STAT. § 59-511 (1939) (restricted
ownership by aliens to those who were eligible for citizenship, thereby incorporating the immigration law which excluded Japanese).
51. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 34.
52. Immigration and Nationality Act, §§ 311, 477, 66 Stat. 239 (1952)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1970)).
53. There are still some insignificant groups of aliens ineligible for citizenship. See note 59 infra.
54. 1953 CAL. STAT., at 1816. The act was repealed after the state
supreme court held that the alien land law was invalid as violating the fourteenth amendment in Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
55. See note 59 infra (present state statutes based upon federal immigration law).
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PRESENT STATE ALIEN LAND LAWS

From their history, it is evident that state restrictions were a
hasty response to needs that were believed to be compelling at
the moment. Most anti-alien legislation found acceptance only
during times of strong public emotion: the Revolution; the frontier period; and the anti-Japanese agitation. Each state legislature reacted in a different manner, at a different time, which
resulted in ad hoc treatment of alien land ownership. This historical development produced four broad categories of state restrictive laws: (1) restrictions which adopt the common law
rule of general prohibition; 56 (2) restrictions which have replaced the strict common law prohibition with the requirement
of citizen status for the purpose of land ownership;5 7 (3) restric56. Group 1: Six jurisdictions have adopted the general common law
prohibition, with the exception of allowing only alien residents to own property. For Alaska and Hawaii, the Alien Land Law, 48 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq.
(1974), which prohibits aliens from owning land in their territories, was in
effect at statehood and was never repealed. See Sullivan, supra note 24, at
20 n.26. Alaska itself has not imposed any restrictions. In Hawaii, there are
no express restrictions, except in regard to a residential lot on the island of
Oahu, in which case the purchaser must be a United States citizen or de-

clarant alien who has resided in the state for five years or more. HAw.
STAT. §§ 206-09, 516-33 (Supp. 1979).

REV.

The four other states are Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and
Oklahoma. Compare Miss. CONST. art. 4, § 84 (the legislature "shall enact
laws to limit, restrict, or prevent the acquiring and holding of land in [Mississippi] by non-resident aliens") with MIss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-23 (1974)
(nonresident aliens may not acquire or hold land except through enforcement of a lien).
Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:20 (1968) (allowing resident aliens
to acquire property in same manner as citizens) with Lazarou v. Moravos,
101 N.H. 383, 143 A.2d 669 (1958) and Hanafin v. McCarthy, 95 N.H. 36, 37, 57
A.2d 148, 149 (1948) (New Hampshire Supreme Court expressed view that
common law restrictions still apply to nonresident aliens despite statute).
Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3-18 (West Supp. 1979) ("alien friends" have the
same rights as citizens with respect to real estate). Compare Caperell v.
Goodbody, 132 N.J. Eq. 554, 29 A.2d 563 (1942) (defining "alien friends" as
subjects of a foreign state at peace with the United States) with an amendment to § 46, 3-18 in 1943, N.J. LAws 1943 ch. 145 § 1, at 395 ('"riendly alien"
defined to exclude nonresident aliens).
Compare OKLA. CONST. art. 22, § 1 (aliens who are not United States
citizens or bona fide Oklahoma residents are prohibited from acquiring or
owning land) with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 121-27 (1971) (resident aliens
assured of right to acquire property and nonresidents allowed to hold personal property if such rights are accorded United States citizens by laws of
nation to which alien belongs, or by treaty).
57. Group 2. In the following 27 jurisdictions, strict common law
prohibitions have been replaced by assimilation of aliens to citizenship status: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 35-1-1 (1975); Arizona, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. ch.
129, § 1 (1978); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-301 (1971); California, CAL.
[Civ.] CODE § 671 (West 1954); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 306
(1974); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 34-1501 (1973); Florida, FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 2 (1968), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.1101 (Supp. 1977); Georgia, GA.
CODE ANN. § 79-303 (Supp. 1979); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 55-103 (1957); Maine,
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tions which limit the amount and time of holding;5 8 and (4) restrictions which depend upon the citizen eligibility status of the

aliens.

59

ME. REV. STAT. tit. 33,

§ 451 (1978); Maryland,

MD. [REAL PROP.] CODE ANN.

§ 14-101 (1975); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 1 (1970);
Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 26.1105, 26.1106 (1970); Nevada, NEV.
REV. STAT. § 111.055 (1973); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 70-1-24 (1953);
New York, N.Y. [REAL PROP.] LAW § 10(2) (McKinney 1968); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 64-1 (1975); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-11
(1978); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.16 (Page 1976); Rhode Island, R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 34-2-1 (1969); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-201 (1976);
Texas, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 166a (Vernon 1969); Utah, UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-112 (1975); Vermont, VT. CONST. ch. II, § 362; Virginia, VA. CODE
§ 55-1 (1974); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 64.16.005 (Supp. 1979); West
Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 36-1-21 (1966).
58. Group 3. The following nine jurisdictions have restrictions which
limit the amount and/or time of holding: Illinois, ILL REV. STAT. ch. 6, §§ 1-2
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) (limits aliens' right to hold realty for six years or
until alien reaches majority); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-8-1 (Burns
1979) (limits aliens' right to hold realty in excess of 320 acres to five years
from date of acquisition); Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.300, 381.320
(Baldwin 1970) (limits nonresident aliens' right to hold realty to eight years
after acquisition, and resident aliens' right to 21 years); Missouri, Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 442.560(1) (1978) (limits nonresident aliens to acquisition of five
acres of agricultural land); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-402 (1976) (limits
aliens' right to hold realty to five years); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68,
§ 32 (Purdon 1965) (limits alien rights to hold realty in excess of 5,000 acres
or net annual income of $20,000); South Carolina, S.C. CODE § 27-13-30 (1976)
(limits aliens' right to hold realty in excess of 500,000 acres) (see note 72
infra for a discussion of the history behind this statute); South Dakota, S.D.
COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 43-2-9, 43-2A-1-43-2A-7 (Supp. 1979) (a nonresident
alien may not acquire more than 160 acres); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 170.02 (West 1977).
59. Group 4. The following eight jurisdictions restrict ownership of realty according to the alien's status: Colorado, CoLO. CONST. art. II, § 27
(bona fide resident aliens are authorized to acquire property); Iowa, compare IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 22 (alien residents have the same rights as citizens) with IOwA CODE 1977, § 567, as amended 1979 (House File 148 §§ 2, 4)
("[a] nonresident alien, foreign business or foreign government, or an
agent, trustee or fiduciary thereof, shall not purchase or otherwise acquire
agricultural land in this state"); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-511 (1979)
(aliens eligible for citizenship may acquire property in the same manner as
citizens; all other aliens may "transmit and inherit" only as provided by federal treaty); Louisiana, LA. CONST. art. 19, § 20 ("aliens eligible for citizenship"); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 500.221(2) (Supp. 1979) (only citizens and
resident aliens can acquire an interest in agricultural land); Montana,
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91 A-2-111 (1977) (right of an alien to inherit land
is dependent upon existence of a reciprocal right in county where alien resides); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 517.044 (1977) (aliens may not buy state
land unless they are eligible for citizenship); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 34-15101 (1977) (a nonresident alien may acquire property only if a reciprocal
right exists for a United States citizen in nation of the alien citizenship).
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1970),
eliminated racial restrictions on eligibility. This left only three classes of
aliens who were ineligible for citizenship: (1) those opposed to organized
government or favoring totalitarian forms of government; (2) deserters
from the armed forces; and (3) persons relieved from service in the armed
forces due to alienage. Id. Because of these insignificant limitations on citi-
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These restrictions, no two of which are the same, have generated an overwhelming confusion in the minds of American
policymakers and alien investors. As a result, state laws have
inhibited the development of a uniform national policy and a
consistent foreign relations policy in the area of alien ownership
60
of land.
Lack of uniformity in today's land laws creates a trap for the
unwary. Aliens who have the financial and intellectual power
can overcome the restrictions in a variety of ways; those without
such powers cannot. Worst of all, those who do overcome the
state restrictions can do it so well that nobody knows who owns
what. 61 The mechanical effectiveness of state restrictions is
usually overcome through the use of (1) corporate entities,
(2) inheritance laws, and (3) trusts.
Corporate Restrictions
Absent the power to hold title to land directly, an alien may
bypass specific restrictions on individual investors by controlling land indirectly through use of a corporation. Thus, land
laws which are aimed at the individual alien investor lose their
effectiveness unless counterpart legislation affecting corporations exists as well.
The corporation is the most common form of business enterprise in the United States, 62 so it is surprising that only a few
states have enacted substantial restrictions on land acquisition
by corporations. 63 This scarcity of state restrictions on corpo-,
zenship eligibility, state restrictions based on eligibility for citizenship are
neutralized.
60. See H. Zoritsky, ForeignOwnership of Property in the United States.Federaland State Restrictions,C.R.S. 1, 15-24 (July 21, 1978).
61. See notes 177-92 and accompanying text infra.

62. It is estimated that over 570 corporations own slightly less than 60
million acres. This figure includes 5.7 million acres of agricultural land,
which is more than the estimated amount of all land owned by alien individual investors. Data on Foreign Ownership of Property within the United
States. Hearingson H.R. 7411 before the Subcommittee on Censru and Population, 95th CONG., 1ST SEss. 20 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Data on Foreign

Ownership]. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
63. Four states (Alaska, Iowa, Nebraska, and South Carolina) exclude
from most land ownership corporations in which aliens hold a majority of
the stock: ALAsKA STAT. § 38.05, 190 (1977) (in acquiring mining rights, no
more than 50 percent of its stock may be owned or controlled by aliens who
could not own the stock directly); IOWA CODE § 491.67 (1977) (corporations
incorporated outside the United States and all other corporations in which
half or more of the stock is owned by nonresident aliens are prohibited from
acquiring title to or holding agricultural land); NaB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-40276-414 (1976) (a corporation may hold land within three miles of a village or
city limits if the majority of its directors or managers are aliens, or if a majority of its stock is owned by aliens); S.C. CODE §§ 27-13-10, 27-13-30, 27-13-40
(1976) (no alien or alien-controlled corporation may own more than 500,000
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rate ownership of land is best explained by the state of corpoacres of land). Because of the enormous figure of 500,000, the legislature in
effect drafted a meaningless statute. See note 72 infra (history behind the
legislation).
Drafters of future legislation should be careful in their choice of words.
"Majority" or "50 percent" are insufficient restrictions because one can have
control of a corporation with 20 or 30 percent ownership. The drafter should
use the word control, for it is much broader.
Wisconsin applies a stricter prohibition. Wis. STAT. § 710.02 (1977) (no
corporation in which more than 20 percent of the stock is held by a nonresident alien may acquire more than 640 acres). Although 20 percent is more
restrictive than majority, it is ineffective because Wisconsin does not require the corporation to report its land holdings.
Six states, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and
South Dakota, prohibit foreign corporations from holding farm land or engaging in farming. IOWA CODE § 567 (1977) as amended 1979 (House File 148
§§ 2, 4) ("[a] nonresident alien, foreign business or foreign government, or
an agent, trustee or fiduciary thereof, shall not purchase or otherwise acquire agricultural land in this state"). MINN. STAT. § 500.24 (1979) (corporations are prohibited from farming or acquiring real estate used for farming
or capable of being used for farming). This concept is very broad because it
may affect non-agricultural activities as well. However, statutory exceptions permit industrial development on agricultural land acquired by corporations, subject to limitations. See, e.g., id. § 500.24(2) (h) (1979). Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 442.560(2) (1978) (corporations not engaged in farming before Sept.
28, 1975 are prohibited from farming and acquiring any interest in agricultural land subject to exceptions). N.D. CENT. CODE 10-06-01 (1976) (domestic and foreign corporations are prohibited from engaging in farming or
agriculture). OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 951 (West Supp. 1979) (corporations
may not engage in farming or ranching except in special circumstances);
S.D. CONST. art. XVII, § 7 (domestic and foreign corporation ownership of
farm land is prohibited).
Although these restrictions are severe, they will be ineffective unless
they are coupled with the requirement of an annual disclosure. However,
only those of Iowa, Minnesota, and North Dakota are drafted in a manner
which would inhibit the formation of a personal holding corporation to circumvent the statutes' applicability to individuals.
Iowa, IOWA CODE 1977, § 561, as amended 1979 (House File 148 §§ 2,4),
and North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-01 (1976), have express prohibitions against personal holding corporations. Minnesota requires a majority
of the shareholders to reside on the farm or actively engage in farming.
MINN. STAT. § 500.24(1) (9) (1979). Three states, Arizona, Connecticut, and
West Virginia, require a certificate of authority before the corporation can
acquire real estate. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-240 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 47-57 (1958); W. VA. CODE § 11-12-78 (1966) (corporations which acquire more than 10,000 acres of land must obtain a license for which a tax of
five cents per acre over 10,000 would be charged).
The legislators can constitutionally exclude corporations from certain
businesses. The Supreme Court, in Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S.
106 (1949), held that such classification of corporations will be judged by the
lenient "rational basis" test, since no fundamental human rights are involved. The Court expressed an unwillingness to substitute its economic
judgment for that of the legislature.
Kentucky, Nebraska, and Texas restrictions provide that a corporation
may only acquire land necessary for its business. Ky. REV. STAT. § 271A
705(1) (Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-402-76-414 (1976) (corporations
may hold land necessary for business as common carriers or public utilities,
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rate law at the time restrictions against alien individuals were
64
developed.
Unlike individuals, corporations which are not engaged in
interstate commerce have only those rights that are conferred
upon them by the laws of the state in which they operate. 65 Apparently, legislatures thought they could limit alien corporate
land ownership by simply excluding undesired corporations, or
denying such corporations the right to own land. 66 However, at
the time restrictions on individual ownership were developed
the number of corporations was negligible. Today, with extensive growth of the corporate form of doing business, states cannot entirely screen those corporations admitted to do business.
Furthermore, corporate purpose clauses have expanded to allow
almost any legitimate purpose, 67 and corporate land ownership
often is expressly authorized. 68
The result is that if the alien is not free to own land directly,
he may be able to own it indirectly in most areas in the United
States by employing the corporate form. Because of ineffective
drafting of statutes, poor determination of which corporations
are to be restricted, 69 a lack of express prohibitions against personal holding corporations, 70 and the failure to buttress restrictions with strict disclosure laws, 71 the serious alien investor
or for manufacturing plants, petroleum service stations, or bulk stations);

TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-4.01-04 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
Apparently, these states want to avoid losing corporations and the po-,

tential prosperity they will bring. A corporation would be reluctant to invest millions in a business operation in a state where it cannot own the land
on which the business is situated. Wilner &Smith, supra note 10, at 631 n.H.
64. For an analysis of the historical development of state restrictions on
individual alien ownership of land, see notes 25-54 and accompanying text
supra.
65. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869); Bank of Augusta v.
Forle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
66. See note 63 supra.
67. See, e.g., A.B.A.-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 3 (1974) ("any lawful
purpose or purposes, except for the purpose of banking or insurance").
68. See, e.g., id. § 4(d).

69. See note 63 supra.
70. Id.
71. Several states require annual disclosure by corporations in order to
be kept apprised of their situations. Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act, P.A. 81-187, 1979 Ill. Legis. Serv. (West) (any legal entity must
report any interest acquired in agricultural land in this state); IOWA CODE
§§ 172A, 5679 (Supp. 1978); Mum. STAT. § 500.24 (1979) (aliens, corporations,
and limited partnerships are required to register land holdings and make
certain annual disclosures); KAN. STAT. § 17-5901 (1978); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 442.560(2) (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1506 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 57.755,
57.757 (1977).
Without strict disclosure laws the restrictions on corporate holdings of
real estate are ineffective. Minute Maid Corporation is a case in point. In
Florida, Minute Maid Corporation owns the largest part of the citrus farms.
The Minute Maid Corporation is owned by the Coca-Cola Corporation, but
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would face only a small obstacle to land ownership in those
states that have corporate restrictions. Even in states where the
restrictions seem to present an impossible obstacle, large foreign investors, particularly corporations, have been able to obtain legislative exemption from the law. 72 This practice will
continue unless a uniform federal policy is adopted.
Inheritance

Inheritance is another means of alien acquisition of land. A
dozen states at present impose restrictions on inheritance of
real estate by aliens. 73 While these restrictions do not directly
affect alien investment, they do discourage potential investorsalien or not-who wish to devise their land holdings to aliens.
Most of the constraints on inheritance fall into two broad
categories. First, there are those that prohibit inheritance only
if the alien's nation would deprive that person of inheritance
rights; 74 second, there are those that prohibit inheritance only if
the alien's nation would not grant a reciprocal inheritance right
to a United States citizen. 75 Some states, to avoid discouraging
investors, allow an alien heir a long time to dispose of property
which would otherwise be6 held in violation of general restric7
tions on alien ownership.
we do not know how much of the Coca-Cola Corporation is owned by for-

eign investment. Thus, we do not know how much of the citrus farms could
be controlled through stock ownership of a very large corporation that owns
another corporation that owns the land. See Data on Foreign Ownership,
supra note 62, at 7. Therefore, any effective restriction on corporate ownership would need a disclosure law which would inform the state not only of
the acreage which the corporation owns, but also of who owns the corporation. See notes 177-92 and accompanying text infra (discussion of the federal disclosure acts.).
72. In 1956, a special session of the South Carolina legislature increased
the maximum amount of land an alien might hold in the state from 500 to
500,000 acres. S.C. ACTS No. 1131 (1956). The reported reason for the increase was to obtain location within the state of a Bowater Paper Corporation pulpmill. See Wall St. J., May 31, 1955, at 17, col.4.
73. See notes 74-76 infra.
74. Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-57 (West Supp. 1978); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 206, § 27B (1969); New Jersey, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 3A: 25-10 (1953); New York, N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT. § 2218(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1978); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. § 863.37 (1973).
75. Iowa, IOWA CODE § 567 (1977) as amended 1979 (House File 148 § 6);

Nebraska,

NEB. REV. STAT. §

4-107 (1974); North Carolina, N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 64-3 (1975); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 2-3-107 (Supp. 1978).
76. Compare Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.300 (Baldwin 1970) (limiting

right to acquire land to only those aliens who have declared their intention
to become citizens) with Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.330 (Baldwin 1970) (nonresident aliens who have not declared their intention to become citizens
inherit property, but must dispose of it within eight years). Compare OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 121-22 (1971) (no alien may hold land unless he is a
bona fide resident of the state) with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 123 (1971)
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Acquisition of Property by Trust
Trust law does not specifically deal with aliens. However,
the trust concept was used in England to circumvent the strict
prohibition against alien land ownership. 77 Today, a similar
trust concept can be used to overcome restrictions on individual
and corporate forms of alien ownership of land. 78 The situation
in Illinois provides a good example.
Under present Illinois law, title to real property, both legal
and equitable, may be conveyed to a trust while the beneficial
control of the land is retained by the alien. 79 This can be accomplished because Illinois alien land law80 does not apply to a ben81
eficial interest, which is considered personal property, and
82
Illinois law does not restrict aliens' rights to personal property.
of trust law was approved by the Illinois
This interpretation
83
Supreme Court.
Use of the land trust is not confined to Illinois. There is
nothing unique about the land trust that would set it apart from
a regular trust. A land trust is created where a deed to the
trustee, commonly labeled a deed in trust, apparently gives a
trustee full power to deal with the real estate.84 However, the
(nonresident aliens may inherit land, but they must dispose of it within five
years).
77. See Morrison, supra note 5, at 623.
78. The trust has recently become a more familiar conveyancing device
to nonresident aliens because it provides both confidentiality and tax benefits. See W.B. Warren, Personal Trustsfor Non-Resident Aliens, 115 TRUSTS
& EST. 600 (Oct. 1976). No state specifically restricts the use of a trust to
circumvent its statute against alien ownership of property, and none expressly limits the right of aliens to own personal property in the state. See
notes 56-59 supra.
79. Trust and Trustees Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, § 71 (1977).
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 6, §§ 1-2 (1966).
81. Id. ch. 148, § 71.
82. "Aliens have full right to acquire and hold land, either by purchase
or inheritance or otherwise, but must dispose of it within 6 years." Id.
593, 1 N.E.2d 59 (1936). In Viahos, the
83. Vlahos v. Andrews, 362 Ill.
alien beneficiaries brought an action against trustees to compel conveyance
of the real estate that was the subject of the trust. The trust agreement
provided that a citizen was to hold property for the aliens and to reconvey
upon naturalization of one of the alien owners. The deed whereunder the
property was conveyed to the new citizen was held a valid enforceable trust
as against the contention that the deed was an illegal agreement to defraud
the state of the opportunity to declare forfeiture of the aliens' property. Id.
at 597, 1 N.E.2d at 61.
84. The public records appear as though the trustee's powers are complete. Actually, the powers of the trustee are restricted by a trust agreement executed previously to or concurrently with, and incorporated into,
the deed in trust, whereby the beneficiary retains full powers of management and control which permits the trustee to deal with the property only
when so directed by the beneficiary. GARRETT, LAND TRuSTS, CHICAGO Wn-
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beneficiary of the trust controls the rights and duties of the
trustee, in effect controlling the land.
The duties imposed on the trustee maintain the validity of
this trust relationship. Under Illinois law, the beneficiary may
direct the trustee to convey land. The trustee must also sell at
public sale any property remaining in the trust within a specified time, usually twenty years. 85 These duties classify the trust
as active, so that the Statute of Uses does not nullify the trusteebeneficiary relationship. 86 Illinois decisions which have upheld
land trusts involving these limited duties applied well-established legal principles. 87 This reliance on common law minimizes the distinction between a statutory land trust and a
regular common law trust agreement. Therefore, it appears that
the absence of a statutory land trust in a state would not prevent
an alien from circumventing the state's land ownership restrictions.
Virginia, Florida, Indiana, and North Dakota have adopted
the liberal land trust concept of Illinois. 88 Other states, although
they have adopted the land trust concept, require more duties
on the part of the trustee. 89 In several states, land trusts are
being used without statutory or case law guidance. 90 An alien
can evidently avoid direct land restrictions by holding land in
compliance with the trust law of any state he chooses.
It becomes obvious that state legislation must be broad and
inclusive. The drafter of future legislation must determine
TLE AND TRUST COMPANY

(Booklet) 1,2 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as

GARRETT].
For an analysis of land trusts see Turner, Some Legal Aspects of Beneficial Interests under Illinois Land Trust, 39 ILL. L. REV. 216 (1945). See also
Baker & Schulz, The North Dakota Land Trust, 45 N.D. L REV. 77 (1968);
Cowardine, Land Trusts, Some Problemsin Virginia, 7 WM. &MARY L. REV.
368 (1966); Ford, Land Trust Act, 18 U. MLAI L. REV. 698 (1964).

85. See GARRETr, supra note 84, at 10. See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148,
§ 71 (1977).
86. Breen v. Breen, 411 Ill. 206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1952); see Chicago Title &
Trust Co. v. Mercantile Bank, 300 IMI.App. 329, 20 N.E.2d 992 (1939) (thorough discussion of the Statute of Uses in connection with land trusts). See
note 87 infra.
87. The Statute of Uses was transplanted from England to the United
States and is the law of Illinois. Breen v. Breen, 411 Ill. 206, 103 N.E.2d 625
(1952); Kirkland v. Cox, 94 M. 400 (1880). The effect of the Statute of Uses is
that the holder of the use, the beneficiary, becomes the holder of the legal
estate of the same character as the equitable or use estate which he formerly owned. For a discussion of the history of the Statute of Uses see 5
AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 1.16

(A.J. Casner ed. 1952) (Professor Simes,

author).

88. VA. CODE § 55-17.1 (1974); FLA. STAT. §689.071 (1973); IND.

tit. 30, § 13 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-03-02 (Supp. 1967).
89. See GARRETT, supra note 84, at 2.
90. Id.
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whether a statute limiting alien ownership will prohibit holding
of legal title only, or whether it will restrict other interests in
land. The effect of leaseholds and beneficial title held under a
trust should be a major concern.9 1
THE EFFECT OF STATE RESTRICTIONS

A critical flaw in state laws which attempt to control alien
ownership of land is that they are mechanically ineffective, and
therefore little more than nuisances. Due to their lack of uniformity, they pose problems for those who cannot protect themselves, but present few impediments in the way of the serious
alien investor. 92 Correcting the major mechanical flaws with
which present state statutes regulating alien ownership are afflicted 93 would be only the first step toward an effective statute.
A second major concern is constitutional effectiveness.
Both the federal government and the individual states may constitutionally impose statutory restrictions on ownership of domestic property, subject to some limitations. 94 The state
95
restrictions generally affect ownership of real property, are
often limited to agricultural property, and vary significantly in
are narrower,
scope and effect. 96 The present federal limitations
97
and normally affect specific industries.
91. Only Arizona expressly prohibits leases and subleases; this prohibition extends to corporations not qualified to do business in the state, and
not to individuals. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-240 (1978).
92. See notes 60-91 and accompanying text supra (flaws in the law grant
the large investor an advantage).
The small investor, who probably does not have the means to obtain
legal advice, is at a disadvantage. If the individual is a citizen or an alien
investor, and lives in a state that restricts inheritance, the person will be
unable to devise land to relatives in the old country. See notes 74-76 and
accompanying text supra. Furthermore, the alien resident versus nonresident distinction established by some states puts the small alien investor at
another disadvantage. A resident alien landowner who leaves the state and
returns to the nation of his citizenship for a substantial period of time may
inadvertently have placed his ownership rights in jeopardy. See note 59
supra.
93. See notes 56-92 and accompanying text supra.
94. See notes 100-03 and accompanying text infra.
95. See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
96. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
97. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 2272 (West 1975) (regulating foreign investment in
the aircraft industry); 10 U.S.C.A. § 7435 (West Supp. 1979) (regulating right
of foreign citizens to lease any land in the naval petroleum or other naval
reserves); 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1813(a), (b), (e) 1815 (West Supp. 1979) (regulating
foreign investment in United States banks); 16 U.S.C.A. § 797(e) (West
1974) (prohibiting licenses for construction of dams, conduits, and reservoirs to non-citizens and foreign corporations); 30 U.S.C.A. § 181 (West
1971) (restricting leases of mineral lands of the United States to American
citizens, and citizens of another country which affords United States citizens similar rights under its law); id. § 1015 (geothermal production leases
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The purpose of both state and federal enactments is to exclude or restrict alien influence in the local economy. 98 Obviously, both governments are restricted by the Constitution in
achieving this purpose. 99 Although either the state or federal
government may be capable of drafting an alien land law that is
mechanically effective, apparently only a federal law can also be
constitutionally effective.
Land law is principally state law, 100 which seems practical.
However, any attempted state regulation of alien ownership of
on federal lands may be issued only to citizens of the United States and to
domestic corporations); 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1503(g), 1502(5) (West 1978) (a license to construct, operate, or own a deep water port may only be issued to
a United States citizen or an organization whose chief executive officers and
a quorum of its board of directors are United States citizens); 40 U.S.C.A.
§ 782 (West 1969) (prohibits disposition of long-line communications facilities in Alaska in a manner which would place their direct or indirect control
in an alien); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2133, 2134 (West 1973) (prohibiting issuance of
licenses to any alien or corporation controlled, owned, or dominated by an
alien to transport, produce, or acquire atomic energy facilities); 46 U.S.C.A.
§§ 802, 835, 1151, 1152 (West 1975) (regulating the shipping industry with respect to foreign investment); 47 U.S.C.A. § 17,222 (West Supp. 1979) (regulating the telegraph industry with respect to foreign investment); id. § 310
(West Supp. 1979) (prohibiting the issuance of a radio station license to an
alien or foreign corporation).
The present federal alien land law relating to private property does not
focus on the same matters as state law. The foundation of the federal laws
is the control of enemy and hostile alien assets to further the defense and
foreign relations interest of the United States. Under the Trading with the
Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A. APP. §§ 4-9 (West Supp. 1979) property of enemy
aliens may be seized and administered by the United States government.
Except for the limited exception noted above, no federal legislation has
been passed to limit foreign investment in privately-owned American real
estate.
Other federal legislation deals with property rights on federal public
lands. It consists of a body of law made up of more than 2,600 acts of Congress. See Morrison, Legal Regulation of Alien Land Ownership in the
United States, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 8 REPORT TO CONGRESS OF FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, M-28 to M-36 app. (1976) for an

extensive treatment of federal laws and regulations applying to federal public lands.

98. It is commonly understood that those in a local economy who own
the large tracts of land, and pay the majority of the tax, have the power to
influence, or even control, the local economy.
99. See Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 484 (1880) (provisions of the
treaty between the United States and the Swiss confederation were sufficient to override conflicting provisions in a Virginia statute concerning alien
inheritance); Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817). A treaty stipulation may protect the land of an alien from forfeiture by escheat under the

laws of a state. In Chirac, it was held that a treaty with France granted
French citizens the right to purchase and hold land in the United States,
removed the incapacity of alienage, and placed them in precisely the same
situation as if they had been citizens of the United States. The state statute
limiting alien rights to control land was thus of no consequence in relation
to the treaty, which, under the Constitution, is the supreme law of the land.
100. See Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 484 (1880) ("The law of
nations recognizes the liberty of every government to give foreigners only
such rights, touching immovable property within its territory, as it may see
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land within its boundaries is subject to two major limitations:
direct constitutional limitations under the equal protection and
due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment, 10 1 and indirect limitations resulting from inherent federal jurisdiction over
10 2
foreign affairs.
Direct ConstitutionalLimitations
Aliens have long been held to be "persons" within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment generally, and of the
equal protection clause in particular. Thus the threshold criterion for constitutional protection is met by those against whom
the alien laws discriminate. 103 This protection "extends to foreign nationals lawfully within the United States."'1 4 It is when
aliens are designated as a class, and the class's rights of land
ownership are regulated, that state and federal regulations become subject to judicial scrutiny.
Equal Protection
It is often argued that the equal protection clause prohibits
wholesale discrimination against resident aliens, but not against
nonresident aliens. A nonresident alien, who is not physically
fit to concede .... In our country, this authority is primarily in the states
where the property is situated.")
101. See notes 103-37 and accompanying text infra.
102. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968). In Zschernig, the Court
stated that state laws may be invalidated solely because they constitute "an
intrusion by the state into the field of foreign affairs." Id. Here, the Court
declared invalid an Oregon statute which conditioned a nonresident alien's
right to take property by succession on a showing that the claimant's country offered reciprocal rights to United States citizens, and that the claimant
would have the right to receive the property without confiscation.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (state cannot enter into independent negotiations regarding property, probate, or any other matter); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (presumption of preemption is much stronger in
foreign relations than in most other fields).
103. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The Yick Wo Court stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the
protection of citizens .... These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences in race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal
protection of the laws is the protection of equal laws.
Id. at 369. Cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) ("a person [in

the fourteenth amendment context] encompasses lawfully-admitted resident aliens, as well as citizens of the United States, and entitles both citizens and aliens to equal protection of the laws of the state in which they
reside").
104. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886).
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within the state's borders, is not "within its jurisdiction.' ' 5
Thus, regulation of investment by nonresident aliens may be
characterized as "economic regulation," subject only to the "ra10 6
tional basis" test.
Current equal protection doctrine offers two levels of constitutional protection. If a law employs suspect classifications or
affects fundamental rights, the "higher test" applies and the gov10 7
ernment must show a compelling interest to support the law.
All other classifications are judged by a "lower test," which simply requires a rational relationship between the classification
and its intended purpose. 10 8 The "higher test" is more difficult
to satisfy than the "lower test." Thus, in considering the validity
of a statute regulating foreign ownership and investment in
land, the critical question is which standard of review to apply.
The Supreme Court has found aliens to be "a prime example of
a 'discrete and insular' minority . . . for whom ... heightened
judicial solicitude is appropriate,"' 1 9 and has referred to the
"strict scrutiny" standard of review in two major categories of
cases concerning aliens. 110
The first category deals with classifications based on alienage itself, restricting the alien's ability to earn a livelihood in
different occupations or to receive economic benefits from the
state. The Court has declared unconstitutional a limitation on
105. De Tenorio v. McGowan, 510 F.2d 92, 101 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423

U.S. 877(1975); Liebman &Levine, Foreign Investors and Equal Protection,
27 MERCER L. REV. 615, 618-19 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Liebman & Levine] (use of term "jurisdiction" may suggest the broader meaning of "sub-

ject to its laws," and it might be supposed that the fact of the prohibition
against acquiring or holding land is itself an exercise of jurisdiction over the
nonresident, nonpresent alien).
106. See note 108 and accompanying text infra.
107. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 10 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192-94 (1964).

108. E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); McGowan v. Ma-

ryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-27 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483, 489 (1955); Lindsley v. National Carbolic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).

109. In re Grifflths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973). However, Justice Rehnquist dissented in these two cases:
[T]here is no language in the [fourteenth] Amendment, or any other
historical evidence as to the intent of the framers, which would suggest

to the slightest degree that it was intended to render alienage a "suspect" classification, that it was designed in any way to protect "discrete
and insular minorities" other than racial minorities ....
Id.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (state laws which denied wel-

fare benefits to resident aliens and to aliens who had not resided in the
United States for a specified number of years were unconstitutional because they deprived these persons of equal protection).
110. E.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw § 16-6 (1978).
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the proportion of aliens in an employer's work force;'
exclusion of aliens from the practice of law; 112 denial to aliens of the
right to be licensed to practice civil engineering; 113 denial of welfare benefits to aliens; 1 4 denial to nondeclarant aliens of state
financial aid for higher education;1 1 5 and denial to aliens of real
estate licenses."l 6 It is thus generally held that discrimination
against aliens as a class is sustainable only if it is necessary to
the accomplishment of a permissible state purpose or protection
7
of a substantial state interest."
The second line of cases deals with ownership of land by a
subclass of aliens-those ineligible for citizenship. In Terrace v.
Thompson," 8 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Washington statute prohibiting nondeclarant aliens from owning nonmineral lands except those acquired by inheritance. The basis
of the decision was the recognition of a valid legislative purpose
for distinguishing between citizens and aliens. For a period
after Terrace, the Court upheld, over constitutional challenge,
California statutes based expressly on ineligibility for citizen119
ship.
In 1948, the tide turned with the decision of Oyaman v. California i 20 The Court reversed itself and declared that the California Alien Land Law, which forbade ineligible aliens from
111. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
112. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
113. Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) ("the governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is to be carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and
substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to
achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn").
114. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
115. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
116. Indiana Real Estate Comm'n v. Satoskar, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
117. See note 103 supra.
118. 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (under immigration laws then prevailing, Orientals were ineligible for citizenship).
119. Porterfleld v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923). An alien land law forbidding aliens not eligible for citizenship under the laws of the United States to
lease land in California was not violative of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. The classification was held not to be arbitrary
or unreasonable although the right to lease land was conferred on other
aliens. Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923). In Webb, a citizen attempted
to enter into a cropping agreement with a Japanese citizen. The Court
stated that a citizen had no legal right to enter into a contract with an alien
not eligible for citizenship under United States law, unless the alien was
permitted by law to make and carry out that contract. Cf. Frick v. Webb, 263
U.S. 326 (1923) (because a treaty between the United States and Japan did
not extend to subjects of Japan the right to use land within the United
States for agricultural purposes, the Court upheld a statute prohibiting
ownership by a Japanese subject of stock in a corporation owning farm
land).
120. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
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owning or transferring land, was unconstitutional because it denied aliens equal protection of the law. 121 A Washington law
which prevented ineligible aliens from obtaining commercial
fishing licenses was invalidated in Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Commission.122 The state claimed a special interest in preserving natural resources for its citizens. The Court rejected this ara
gument by characterizing commercial fishing as "earning
123
living," a fundamental right protected by strict scrutiny.
The constitutional safeguards and protections previously
discussed have generally been afforded only to resident aliens
and not to nonresident aliens, 24 for several reasons. Nonresident aliens as a class constitute ninety percent of the world's
population, so they can hardly be labeled "a 'discrete and insular' minority ... for whom ... heightened judicial solicitude is

appropriate."'1 25 Furthermore, only the investment of a nonresident is at stake, not his means of earning a living. 126 Finally, the
nonresident is a greater "threat" to the community, for his interest in the local community is limited, and he is much more likely
than _the resident alien to have conflicting diplomatic support
from his own government. 127 Since the Court has given no precise statement on the extent of constitutional protection afforded nonresident aliens, review of such classifications would
seem to require even less than the rational basis needed to uphold nonsuspect classifications under the fourteenth amendment. As a result, state legislation regulating the property
rights of nonresident aliens would be more likely to withstand a
constitutional challenge than legislation dealing with the rights
of resident aliens. 28 There is clearly a relationship between the
classification excluding aliens and its ostensible immediate purpose, exclusion of alien influence from the state. States may
also be better able to restrict the property rights of nonresident
29
than of resident aliens in the exercise of their police powers.
121. At this time, only Japanese were ineligible for citizenship under fed-

eral law. As a result, escheat held in the defendant son's name would be

based solely on his father's nationality. The Court saw this as impermissible racial discrimination against a citizen. Four of the Justices comprising
the majority would have held the statutory classification race-based and
therefore unconstitutional on its face. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. at 650
(Murphy, J., concurring).
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
States

334 U.S. 410 (1948).
Id.
See note 103 and accompanying text supra.
See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 111-16 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 39-50 and accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Shaughnessy v. United
ex rel. Mezel, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763

(1949). See also Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77-78 (1977).
129. See note 128 and accompanying text supra.
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The state is severely restricted by the requirement of equal
protection in attempting to regulate alien land ownership. The
federal government, on the other hand, is subject to fewer direct
restrictions. The federal government's ability to legislate is limited to the powers enumerated in article one of the United
States Constitution. 130 Except with respect to land in the District of Columbia, 13 1 there is no express federal power to regulate the purchase, sale, or ownership of property. However, the
federal government is far from powerless. It has a significant
basis for such legislation in its supremacy over national mat13 2
ters.
Equal protection doctrine, at least in an attenuated form,
also applies against the federal government. 133 As a result, the
courts have held discrimination against aliens in federal civil
service regulations 34 and in disaster loan programs unconstitutional. 135 However, the major federal regulations restricting
property ownership by aliens are much more readily defended
against equal protection attack than are state laws, whether applied to residents or to nonresidents. Where state laws have
wholesale proscriptions against all aliens, the federal government singles out citizens of certain nations for restrictive treatment. 136 States create restrictions to protect local economy and
security; the federal government does so to protect the United
States from hostile activities within its borders, and to protect
the interests of individual aliens from potentially more serious
37
state actions.
The strongest impact of the equal protection clause is that it
forbids wholesale discrimination against resident aliens by either the state or the federal government. The restriction of federal discrimination against nonresident aliens is not so strong.
The nonresident alien will not be protected by the strict scrutiny
130. U.S. CONST. art. 1.
131. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 18.

132. See notes 142-44 and accompanying text infra.
133. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Boling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954).
134. Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 500 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.), affd, 426 U.S. 88
(1976).
135. Ramos v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 376 F. Supp. 361 (D.P.R.
1974).
136. The government is capable of such discretion under its various constitutional powers. See notes 142-44 infra (greatest source is the treaty
power).
137. See notes 142-44 infra (because of federal supremacy, any restrictive
state law must give way to a more permissive federal law).
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test (unless his interest is coupled with a fundamental right),
and it will be more difficult for him to convince the court that the
restrictions imposed are not rationallyrelated to the purpose of
excluding foreign influence.
Due Process
While equal protection checks the legitimacy of the classification imposed, due process inquires into the legitimacy of the
purpose for the classification. To satisfy current substantive
due process requirements, the state need only show a rational
relationship between the purpose of the law and a legitimate
state interest. 3 8 The due process clause is not an effective limitation on state legislation, but it does compel a clear articulation
of the purpose of the laws, and thus makes possible a proper
constitutional examination of them under the applicable tests.
In effect, the standard due process test is the same as that
for nonsuspect classifications under the equal protection clause.
Thus, it only protects against arbitrary and capricious laws.

39

Any argument against a state regulation is therefore more likely
to be based on the equal protection clause than on the less strict
due process clause.
There is no apparent basis in the due process clause for invalidating a law prohibiting nonresident aliens from owning
land. However, due process does allow several essential protections against alien ownership. The due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment incorporates the fifth amendment obligation to provide compensation for the taking of property for
public use. l 4° Thus, if a state's alien land laws deprive aliens of
their property rights, it can be argued that the state is obligated
41
to compensate them.'
Indirect ConstitutionalLimitations
In addition to the direct constitutional limitations on state
legislation concerning alien ownership of land, the supremacy
clause of article VI of the United States Constitution allows indirect limitations by the federal government. State laws regulating alien land ownership may thus be subject to severe
138. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drugs, 414 U.S. 156,
164-67 (1973); see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963).
139. See note 108 and accompanying text supra.
140. Chicago B. &Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
141. See Shames v. Nebraska, 323 F. Supp. 1321, 1341 (1971) (Van Pelt, J.,
dissenting) (state may provide compensation in the case of escheat or provide a period of time within which the alien may dispose of the land on the
real estate market). See also Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207
(1945) (due process only requires an opportunity to realize market value).
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restraints. First, federal legislation preempts conflicting state
legislation. 142 Second, treaties, because they are the "supreme
l
law of the land,"'143 override inconsistent state legislation.1 4
Third, the federal government has exclusive power over foreign
affairs. 145 It is very difficult for a state to draft a statute which
can stand in spite of these sources of federal supremacy.
Preemption
Preemptive federal legislation is supported by the federal
power over naturalization, 146 the power to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce, 147 and the power to provide for the national defense. 1 8 Congress has exclusive power to provide requirements for naturalization and citizenship, 14 9 and for the
admission or deportation of aliens. 150 This federal power was
the basis for invalidating state restrictions on resident aliens in
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission'5' and Graham v.
Richardson.152 The state limitations affected the alien's ability
to earn a living, and this interfered with the permission granted
by the federal government allowing him to establish permanent
142. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (Court struck down a
state section law preempted by the federal Smith Act); Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52 (1941) (state alien registration law invalid in face of federal provision).
143. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
144. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880).
145. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) ("For
purposes of foreign affairs, the United States is, in the eyes of the Constitution, a single nation, without separate states.")

146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
147. Id. cl. 3.

148. Id. cl. 12.
149. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876) (states cannot
use "immigration controls" to exclude aliens whom the federal government
chooses to admit).
150. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). The Court
stated:
That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its
own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation.
It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens, it would
be to that extent subject to the control of another power ....
The
United States, in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or
citizens, are one nation, invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire
territory.
Id. at 603-04.

151. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
152. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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residence in the United States. 53 Land laws would also in effect
limit these fundamentally established rights.
Thus, federal immigration laws coupled with the supremacy
clause15 4 may protect the rights of resident aliens against state
restrictions. 15 5 On the other hand, Congress possesses the
power to regulate the conduct of alien residents, and the terms
of their admission and residency. 5 6 The federal government
could therefore condition entrance and residence of an alien
upon nonacquisition of any interest in domestic property.
There is no federal law which comprehensively regulates
foreign investment by nonresidents, 5 7 so state limitations on
nonresident aliens do not appear to invade the immigration and
naturalization field directly. Thus, the federal preemptive
power would have little effect on a state's regulation of nonresident investments.
The Constitution also grants Congress exclusive power to
"regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states.' 5 8 Under the commerce clause, Congress has been held
to have the power to restrict the importation of undesired
items, 159 impose tariffs on goods, 60 and regulate specific industries.' 6' These precedents would appear to establish Congress's
power to restrict the use of instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce to transact the sale or exchange of property to a
foreign person or his representative. 162 Although the powers to
regulate interstate commerce and to regulate foreign commerce
153. The Court's decision in DeCanos v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), which
sustained a California law prohibiting employment of illegal aliens, is not a
relaxation of this rule. The Court strongly emphasized the fact that the
law's purpose was simply to enlist state authorities in the implementation

of a federal policy.
154. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
155. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376-80 (1971).
156. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Kleindeinst v. Mardel, 408 U.S.
753 (1972); Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909).

Resident aliens have been entitled to legal privileges equal in most respects to those of citizens. E.g., In re Grifflths, 413 U.S. 717 (admission to
the bar); Sugarman v. Dougal, 413 U.S. 634 (right to public employment);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (right to welfare benefits); Truax v.

Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (right to enjoy private employment).
157. See note 97 and accompanying text supra.
158. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
159. Weber v. Freed, 239 U.S. 325 (1915); The Abbey Dodge, 223 U.S. 166
(1912); Butterfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904).
160. Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933); Groves v.
Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841).
161. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
162. North Am. Co. v. Securities Exchange Comm'n, 327 U.S. 686 (1946);
Electric Bond Co. v. Securities Exchange Comm'n, 303 U.S. 419 (1938).

19801

Alien Land Ownership

are generally considered to be equal, 163 foreign commerce is
seen as requiring greater protection,'" including greater protection from state interference.
Finally, Congress has the exclusive power "to raise and support armies ... .,"165 In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,166 the United States Supreme Court held that this power
permits Congress to make such peacetime provisions as it
deems necessary for national defense. One such peacetime provision would appear to be the regulation of foreign ownership of
United States land. It is possible that federal regulation or prohibition of such ownership could be construed to be constitutional.
Treaties
One of the strongest federal powers is the power to make
treaties. Valid treaties supersede state law, even in areas that
167
the federal government has previously left to the states.
Therefore, treaties between the United States and other nations
are positive federal law. Conflict with treaty rights is consequently among the most common defenses to the enforcement
of alien land laws. State statutes denying nationals of other
countries specific rights granted them under international trea68
ties would be invalid.
Few federal treaties directly grant or deny foreign nationals
the right to own property in the United States. 169 However, the
United States has signed approximately 130 "Treaties of Friendship.' 7 0 Such treaties contain "most favored nations" clauses
which provide citizens of the beneficiary countries the same
treatment under the laws of the United States as is given to na163. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 303 U.S. 144 (1938); Pittsburgh
&S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577 (1895).
164. See, e.g., Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
166. 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (Court upheld legislation providing for construction of a dam and electricity generating plant, finding that such energy supplies were an important national defense factor).
167. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
168. See Kolourat v. Oregon, 336 U.S. 187 (1961); Neilson v. Johnson, 279
U.S. 47 (1929); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433 (1921); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S.

258 (1890); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880).
169. One of the exceptions is a treaty with France which requires the
nationals of both countries to apply for and receive prior governmental approval before purchasing real property in the other country. See Protocalto

Convention of Establishment, United States--France, Nov. 25, 1959, 14
(1960), 11 U.S.T. 2398, 2423, T.I.A.S. No. 4625.
170. For several examples of such treaties and their provisions regarding
property ownership of citizens of other nations, see Fisch, State Regulation
of Alien Land Ownership, 43 Mo. L. REv. 407 (1978).
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tionals of any other nation. Included in these treaties are "nationals clauses," which grant the citizens of a beneficiary
country the right to maintain agencies, offices, factories, and
other operations in the United States.
Treaties therefore have an effect on both federal and state
legislation. Treaties supersede not only inconsistent state laws,
but also existing federal law. However, the converse is also true:
Federal legislation restricting alien ownership of land overrides
preexisting treaties and renders them ineffectual. Thus, subsequent state legislation that grants fewer rights to citizens of
countries entitled to most favored nations status than it grants
to citizens of other countries could be held invalid under the
"Treaties of Friendship." Only new federal legislation will have
an effect here.
Foreign Relations
No state may conduct an independent foreign policy, 171 for
all international affairs must be carried on by the federal government.1 7 2 Does state regulation of the rights of aliens to hold real
estate constitute an impermissible exercise of power? The answer varies depending upon the perspective from which one
looks at the laws. As definitions of property rights, state statutes are simply a local concern, focusing on land and the legal
relationships surrounding it. Many statutes have been so justified. 173 If, however, such statutes are viewed as measures affecting aliens, they become an international concern, for they focus
not only on the land but also on relationships that extend beyond national boundaries.
It was only recently that the United States Supreme Court
first enunciated the principle that state laws may be invalidated
solely because they constitute "an intrusion by the state into the
field of foreign affairs."' 74 Intrusion commences when state laws
171. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968). See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN
239 (1972) (views Zschernig as presenting a

AFFAiRS AND THE CoNsTrrUrrON

new Constitutional doctrine).

172. See notes 174-76 and accompanying text infra.
173. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 147, 217-18 (1923); Blythe v. Hinkley, 180 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1901).
174. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,432 (1968). The Court declared invalid an Oregon statute which conditioned a nonresident alien's right to take

property by succession on a showing that the claimant's country afforded

reciprocal rights to United States citizens, and that the claimant would have

the right to receive the property without threat of confiscation. The Court
did not disturb its holding in Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), that a general reciprocity statute is not per se invalid. But it did find that the actual
judicial administration of statutes such as Oregon's involved
inquiries into the types of governments that obtain in particular foreign

nations-whether aliens under their laws have enforceable rights,
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become too diplomatically sensitive. 175 Thus, the question faced
by state legislators is when restriction of alien ownership of land
becomes too "diplomatically sensitive" to be valid. It can now
be argued that any state law which discriminates against aliens,
especially aliens who are not residents of the United States, constitutes an impermissible intrusion into foreign affairs. 176 However, the Supreme Court has not directly so held, although it has
made clear that a law which directly discriminates against particular nations, and thus impinges on our relations with these
nations, must be presumed invalid. A reverse type of provision
favoring another nation would also seem to be invalid.
THE NONDISCLOSURE PROBLEM: THE BASIS OF INEFFECTIVENESS

In addition to problems with the mechanical and constitutional effectiveness of alien statutes, a major concern is the ability of the state or federal government to discover alien
ownership. Whatever policy action is taken must be based on
whether the so-called "rights" are merely dispensations turning upon
the whim or caprice of government officials, whether the representation
of consuls, ambassadors, and other representatives of foreign nations is
credible or made in good faith, whether there is the actual administration in the particular foreign system of law any element of confiscation.
389 U.S. at 434. By contrast, in Clark v. Allen, the state "seemed to involve
no more than a routine reading of foreign laws. Id. at 433. A more extensive
inquiry into administration, however, involves the field of foreign affairs and
is beyond the scope of this paper.
175. Justice Douglas stated in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429:
It seems inescapable that the type of probate law that Oregon enforces
affects international relations in a persistent and subtle way. The practice of state courts in withholding remittances to legatees residing in
Communist countries or in preventing them from assigning them is notorious. The several states, of course, have traditionally regulated the
descent and distribution of estates. But those regulations must give
way ifthey impair the effective exercise of the Nation'sforeignpolicy.
Id. at 400 (citing Berman, Soviet Heirs in American Courts, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 257 (1962)); Chaitkin, The Rights of Residents of Russia and Its Satellites to Share in Estates of American Decedents, 25 S. CAL. L. REv.297 (1952)
(emphasis added).
Decisions using the Zschernig principle to invalidate laws include: In
re Estate of Kraemer, 276 Cal. App. 2d 715, 81 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1969) (California statute that had been sustained in Clark v. Allen was declared invalid);
Demcznk Estate, 444 Pa. 212, 282 A.2d 700 (1971) (statute was invalidated
"on its face" without inquiry into application).
The majority of post-Zschernig decisions have held state statutes valid
where no "animadversions" are required. E.g., Bjarsch v. DiFalco, 314 F.
Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Estate of Kish, 52 N.J. 454, 246 A.2d 1 (1968).
See Comment, The Demise of the "Iron Curtain"Statute, 18 VML.L REV. 49
(1972).
176. See Note, Alien InheritanceStatutes: An Examinationof the Constitutionality of State Laws Restrictingthe Rights of Nonresident Aliens to Inheritfrom American Decedents, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 597, 621-22 (1974).
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adequate information concerning the extent and nature of alien
investment.
The recording of land transactions is traditionally a state
and local responsibility, 177 which causes several problems.
First, land purchasing is typically diverse, and is usually a much
smaller investment than the takeover of an industrial company. 178 Therefore, the land transaction does not get the attention of the press, and is not ordinarily publicly scrutinized.
Furthermore, land records, which are kept at county levels, con179
tain no particular identification of owners.
A second problem is that because of disorganization in state
information-gathering, few states have accurate information
about the amount of land held by resident and nonresident
aliens, increases in the rate of purchases, resultant price increases, and the nature of actual transactions. 180 There is an obvious need for a coordinated fact-finding program to obtain such
information accurately, which would provide strong laws for effective control of alien ownership of land. The federal government is most capable of coordinating such a program.
Congress has begun to respond to this need. Several acts
have authorized federal studies of foreign investment in the
United States. The first such statute was the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974.181 The results of the study it authorized
demonstrated the need for continuous collection of information
on foreign investment in the United States. 18 2 The International
177. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
178. Many federal laws and regulations of specific industries require disclosure. See note 97 supra. However, up until The International Investment Survey Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 3103(d) (1976), there was no such
disclosure requirement on investment in American real estate.
179. Foreign purchasers often go to great lengths to conceal their identi-

ties. In one instance, a West German investor contacted a Canadian realty
firm, which contacted a Wyoming broker, who contacted a Chicago bank,
which hired a Kansas broker, who in turn found a local bank to handle the

purchase of a 2,500-acre Kansas farm. See Rubin, The Selling of California,
CAL. B.J. 404, 410 (Dec. 1978).
Another problem in identifying alien owners develops at the county
level. The land may obviously be held by an individual with a foreign name,
but that individual may be a citizen, a resident alien, or a nonresident alien.
Id.
180. See note 71 supra. See also Alien Ownership of South DakotaFarmland: A Menance to the Family Farm? 23 S.D. L. REV. 735, 737-44 (1978)

(analysis of state statistics on alien ownership of real estate).
181. Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (1974); 15 U.S.C.A. § 786 (West Supp.
1978).
182. For the nation as a whole the study has not found a strong factual
basis for concern about foreign ownership of agricultural land and
other real estate. However, the inadequacy of data in this field, to-

gether with the use of indirect means of obtaining ownership and techniques to avoid ownership disclosure, result in much uncertainty as to
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Investment Survey Act of 1976 was enacted to provide a method
183
for collection of that information.
The Survey Act makes it the duty of the Economics, Statistics and Cooperative Services (ESCS) to produce a method of
disclosure. 184 Enforcement of disclosure may be accomplished
by means of civil and criminal penalties. 185 This study will also
examine such problems as the means by which ownership identity can be hidden; the usefulness of public title and records in
providing data; the adequacy, timeliness, and accuracy of various public and private sources of information;
and comparable
186
methods of reporting in other countries.
The latest federal development in this area is the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978.187 This act requires any "foreign person" who acquires, transfers, or holds
"any interest" (other than a security interest) in agricultural
188
land to report the transaction to the Secretary of Agriculture.
the amount and nature of land owned by aliens, except for a few local
areas for which special investigations have been undertaken that are
summarized in the Commerce Report. There is a need for further investigation.
ForeignInvestment Study Act of 1974: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976).

183. Pub. L. No. 94-472, 90 Stat. 2059 (1976); 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 3101-3108 (West
Supp. 1978).
184. I.S.C.S. is an agency within the Department of Agriculture. See 43
Fed. Reg. 53,783 (1978) (details about the implementation of the study).
Various local, state, and federal agencies will be contacted, as well as buyers and sellers of real estate, officials of financial institutions, brokers, attorneys, and others who participate in the real estate market. Id.
185. Under the Act, failure to furnish required information may subject
the violator to a civil penalty not exceeding $10,000 or a criminal penalty of a
fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment of no more than one year, or
both. 22 U.S.C.A. § 3105 (West Supp. 1979).
186. See id. §§ 1301-1308 (West Supp. 1978). Further information about
the study may be obtained from the National Resource Economics Division,
Economics, Statistics and Cooperatives Service, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture,
Washington, D.C. 20250, (202) 447-9179.
187. Pub. L. No. 95-460, 92 Stat. 1263 (1978).
188. Id. The Act defines "foreign person" in a broad sense to include:
(A) any individual(i) who is not a citizen or national of the United States;
(ii) who is not a citizen of the Northern Mariana Islands or the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; or
(iii) who is not lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence, or paroled into the United States, under
the Immigration and Nationality Act;
(B) any person, other than an individual or a government, which is
created or organized under the laws of a foreign government or
which has its principal place of business located outside all of the
states;
(C) any person, other than an individual or government-
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In contrast to the Survey Act, only civil penalties are provided
for noncompliance with the Act's provisions. 189 The Act also imposes upon the Secretary of Agriculture the duty to make continuous reports' 90 on the effects of alien investment upon family
farms and rural communities. 19 1
It is obvious that Congress is just beginning to respond to
the need for a coordinated fact-finding program. Congress has
not yet started to study the information on foreign ownership of
land in the United States-it is simply studying the methods of
obtaining such information. At present there is no one compre192 Therefore,
hensive source of information on land ownership.
which is created or organized under the laws of any state;
and
(ii) in which, as determined by the Secretary under regulations
which the Secretary shall prescribe, a significant interest or
substantial control is directly or indirectly held
(I) by one individual referred to in subparagraph (A);
(H) by any person referred to in subparagraph (B);
(IMl) by any foreign government; or
(IV) by any combination of such individuals, persons, or
government; and
(D) any foreign government;...
(i) the term "person" includes any individual, corporation,
company, association, firm, partnership, society, joint stock
company, trust, estate, or any other legal entity.
92 Stat. at 1266. The phrase "any interest" includes all interest in agricultural land, including leaseholds of ten years or more, and noncontingent
future interests which will become possessory upon termination of the
present possessory estate. 7 C.F.R. § 781.2(c) (1979).
189. Where the Secretary determines that a person (1) has failed to submit a report, or (2) has knowingly substituted a report which does not contain all of the required information or which contains false or misleading
information, the amount of the penalty is to be determined by the Secretary
as the sum necessary to carry out the purpose of the Act, up to a maximum
of 25 percent of the fair market value of the property on the date of assessment of the penalty. 92 Stat. at 1265.
190. Six months after the effective date of the reporting requirements, a
report will be made by the Secretary of Agriculture. 92 Stat. at 1263. Similar reports will be made after 12 months. Id.
Cf. 7 C.F.R. § 781 (1979) (reports with respect to holdings as of February
1, 1979 must be submitted on or before Aug. 6, 1979). See also 7 C.F.R.
§ 7813(c) (1979) (after Feb. 1, 1979, if a foreign person acquires or transfers
an interest in agricultural land, a report must be ified within 90 days after
date of acquisition or transfer).
191. 92 Stat. at 1263.
192. In a recent hearing before the Subcommittee on Census and Population Concerning Data on Foreign Ownership of Property within the United
States, great concern was expressed about the ability to obtain reliable information. Those presenting the report concerning alien ownership of land
were baffled by the small amount of information available. They had to rely
on journals (local and national), periodicals, and local public records.
(i)

There was no one reliable source. See Data on Foreign Ownership, supra

note 62, at 11. See also note 203 infra (Governors Association's recommendation of a uniform reporting law).
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millions of dollars worth of land can be purchased by aliensresident or nonresident-without detection. Moreover, absent
comprehensive disclosure of alien investments, there is no
ground on which to build a coordinated policy to deal with these
93
investments.
CAVEAT ON FUTURE LEGISLATION

The previous discussion points out the ineffective attempts
by the states to control alien investment in land. A state which
desires to control alien ownership of its land must satisfy two
major objectives-mechanical and constitutional effectiveness.
Mechanical effectiveness can only be achieved by defining
who is an alien and what ownership of land means, and by providing a means of disclosure. It is suggested that legislation
should follow the definition of "foreign persons" used in the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978.194 This
broad and comprehensive definition will allow discretion in
may be set up
scrutinizing any multi-level legal structure which
195
to protect the identity of a foreign investor.
Furthermore, prohibitions on the type of ownership of land
will have to be extended to holding title, 19 6 leasehold interests, 19 7 corporate property, 198 and trust agreements. 199 Acquisition of land through inheritance must also comply with the
ownership restrictions. 20 0 Strict enforcement of these prohibitions will severely curtail the ability of the alien investor to
avoid state-imposed restrictions.
No restrictions will be enforceable without stringent uniform disclosure requirements to reveal noncompliance. Therefore, the state must not only require disclosure, as the federal
government has done, 201 but must also make a coordinated effort to bring essential information to the otherwise uninformed
legislature. 20 2 This information will enable the legislature to es20 3
tablish a policy in regard to amount, time, and type of holding.
193. See note 203 supra.
194. Pub. L. No. 95-460, 92 Stat. 1263 (1978). See note 188 supra (definition

of "foreign person").
195. Such discretion should be utilized to avoid inequities resulting from
the resident-nonresident distinction. See note 92 supra.
196. See notes 56, 58, & 59 and accompanying text supra.

197. See note 91 supra.
198. See notes 62-72 and accompanying text supra.
199. See notes 77-91 and accompanying text supra.

200. See notes 74-76 and accompanying text supra.
201. See notes 177-93 and accompanying text supra.
202. See notes 192 and accompanying text supra. See also note 203 infra.
203. Whatever policy develops regarding restriction of foreign invest-
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Constitutional effectiveness can only be accomplished if the
state statute avoids conflict with due process 2° 4 and equal protection 20 5 requirements, and with powers granted to Congress
by. the Constitution. 206 Conflict with these constitutional standards can only be avoided if the state correctly justifies the statute's "purpose." If the purpose reflects discrimination against
20 7
aliens as a class, with no compelling state interest to justify it,
the statute will not survive. On the other hand, if the purpose is
purely economic-conservation, maintenance, and fair and efficient distribution of land-the courts may simply apply the rational basis of review. 20 8 The whole statute must demonstrate
that its purpose is constitutionally permissible and that the use
of the "alien" classification is necessary to accomplish its purpose of safeguarding the state's economic interests. However,
the indirect constitutional provisions are so broad that any state
statute, no matter how well written, stands a chance of being
20 9
invalidated.
The most obvious answer to the problem is federal legislation, which would provide uniformity and preempt conflicting
state law. It is the federal government that has the power to coordinate efforts to obtain adequate information, 2 10 and with this
information to legislate effectively. The federal government has
several powers on which to base such legislation, 2 11 and a
greater ability to avoid conflict with the Constitution. Indeed,
only the federal government can take a comprehensive approach to alien investment and master the difficulties inherent
in dealing with foreign powers.
Despite the power of Congress to act, it has done so neither
comprehensively nor effectively. There is no guarantee that fedment in United States land, be it to prevent destruction of the family farm,
or to halt economic power, by way of land holdings, from falling under foreign control, it must be based on adequate data which are unavailable at
present. See Policy Position, 1978-79 National Governors Association
(1978).
The Governors Association believes the problem of obtaining adequate
information can only be solved through a coordinated effort. Thus far, the
federal government has not implemented a program to address it. Id. See
notes 181-92 and accompanying text supra (federal government's program
to obtain adequate information). See also note 71 supra (states that have
attempted to deal with the lack of information problem on their own).
204. See notes 138-41 and accompanying text supra.
205. See notes 103-37 and accompanying text supra.
206. See notes 142-76 and accompanying text supra.
207. See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
208. See note 108 and accompanying text supra.
209. See notes 142-76 supra.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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eral legislation is imminent, or that if it is enacted it will conclusively deal with the problem of alien land ownership. The
purpose of this paper is to warn the states that their own legislation-no matter how constructed-is doomed to ineffectiveness.
The responsibility for effective alien land ownership legislation
belongs to Congress. Absent effective and comprehensive legislation, the present state of the law is sending a clear message to
the alien investor that our land is his land.
Ronald L. Bell
JonathanD. Savage

